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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richard W. Kriebel appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
Kriebel filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on November 29,

2007, collaterally attacking his conviction for lewd conduct with a child. 1 (R., p.
3.) In the petition he alleged that his attorney had been deficient for failing to
move to suppress his court-ordered psychosexual sentencing evaluation.

(R.,

pp. 4-5.) The district court thereafter appointed counsel to represent Kriebel.
(R., p. 21.)
The state moved for summary dismissal of the petition. (R., pp. 22-23.)
The bases for the motion were that the petition was untimely and that the
allegations therein were conclusory and unsupported by evidence. (R., pp. 2429.) On Kriebel's request, the district court agreed to first address the issue of
timeliness and reserve the issue of whether the petition was subject to dismissal
on the merits for another time. (Tr., p. 7, L. 21 - p. 8, L. 9.)
Kriebel thereafter filed an affidavit in which he stated that he had been
incarcerated in Washington from some time in September 2005 until some time
in December 2005; that his criminal defense counsel advised him that he did not
have "good prospects" for a post-conviction case and failed to advise him about

1

Kriebel signed the petition on November 23, 2007 and mailed it on November
26, 2007. (R., pp. 6-7.)
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"time-frames and the legal grounds to bring such cases"; that his criminal counsel
had not advised him of the right to remain silent during pre-sentencing testing;
and that the judge made comments based on the pre-sentence report. (R., pp.
36-37.) Also filed was the correspondence from trial counsel referenced in the
affidavit. (Augmentation.) Kriebel's post-conviction counsel filed a brief in which
he argued that the limitation period should be tolled while Kriebel was without
access to Idaho courts and that Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833
(2006), the case on which Kriebel relied, should be given retroactive effect. (R.,
pp. 38-42.)
The state's motion proceeded to hearing on the timeliness of the petition.
(R., p. 43; Tr., p. 10, L. 5 - p. 13, L. 22.) The district court granted the motion
and summarily dismissed. (R., pp. 44-60.) The district court found that Kriebel
had been sentenced on September 1, 2005, and did not appeal his sentence; the
one-year deadline for filing the petition was therefore October 13, 2006; and the
instant petition had been filed on November 29, 2007. (R., p. 48.) The district
court rejected the claim that the limitation period had been tolled due to lack of
access to the courts, concluding that Kriebel's brief out-of-state incarceration
would not have made a difference even if the limitation period tolled during that
time, and that the letter he received from his criminal trial counsel did not deprive
him of access to Idaho courts. (R., pp. 48-51.) The district court also concluded
that Estrada should not be given retroactive application. (R., pp. 51-60.)
Kriebel filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 64-67.)

2

ISSUES
Kriebel states the issues on appeal as:
1)
Did the district court err when it granted the State's motion
for summary dismissal because it erroneously decided that Estrada
should not be retroactively applied to Mr. Kriebel?
2)
Should the statute of limitations to file a post-conviction
petition be tolled in Mr. Kriebel's case because he was denied due
process of law as a result of the new rule announced in Estrada, his
limited access to Idaho resources, and his trial attorney's
discouraging advice on filing a petition for post-conviction relief?
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
1.
Has Kriebel failed to show error in the district court's ruling that retroactive
application of Estrada is not required because it pronounces neither a new rule
nor a "watershed" rule?
2.
Has Kriebel failed to show error in the trial court's determination that he
did not establish that he was denied access to the Idaho Courts such that his
petition could be deemed timely?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Kriebel's Petition Was Not Filed Within The One-Year Time Limit Mandated By
The UPCPA

A.

Introduction
The district court dismissed Kriebel's untimely petition for post-conviction

relief.

(R., pp. 44-60.)

Kriebel argues that he should be excused from the

UPCPA's one-year limitation period for filing a petition because the holding of
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), should be given
retroactive application.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-20.)

Kriebel's argument is

without merit for three reasons. First, because Kriebel filed his petition more than
one year after Estrada was decided his petition is untimely under any legal
standard.

Second, there is no "retroactivity" exception to the one-year filing

deadline of I.C. § 19-4902(a). Third, even if there were such an exception, the
holding of Estrada does not meet the applicable test for retroactive application.

B.

Standard Of Review
The application of a statute of limitation

to an action under a given set of

facts is a question of law subject to free review on appeal. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967,968 (2001); State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244,
245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990); Cochran v. State, 133 Idaho 205,206,984 P.2d
128, 129 (Ct. App. 1999).
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C.

Even If Estrada Were To Be Given Retroactive Effect Kriebel's Petition Is
Untimely
Even if there were a "retroactivity" exception, it would not apply to

Kriebel's petition. The Supreme Court of Idaho decided Estrada on November
24, 2006. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). Kriebel filed
his petition more than a year later, on November 29, 2007. (R., p. 3.) Even if
Kriebel were entitled to the benefit of the "mailbox rule," he sent his petition on
November 26, 2007.

(R., p. 7.)

Mailing his petition more than a year after

Estrada was decided was not within a "reasonable time." See Charboneau v.
State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007) (successive petitions must be filed
within reasonable time of learning facts underlying new claims). Whether this
Court applies the "reasonable time" standard of Charboneau or the one-year
standard of I.C. § 19-4902(a), Kriebel has failed to show his petition was timely
even if Estrada were to be given retroactive effect.

D.

The UPCPA Does Not Include A "Retroactivity" Exception To Its One-Year
Filing Requirement
A proceeding under the UPCPA "may be filed at any time within one (1)

year ... from the determination of an appeal .... " I.C. § 19-4902(a). Absent a
showing by the petitioner that the one-year statute of limitation should be tolled,
the failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for dismissal
of the petition. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Sayas
V. State, 139 Idaho 957,959, 88 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003).

Kriebel argues that the issuance of an opinion by the Idaho Supreme
Court should be given retroactive application and that this justifies dispensing

5

with the UPCPA limitation period.

He has cited no Idaho case holding that

retroactive application of a case is grounds for filing a post-conviction petition
outside of the one-year limitation period of the UPCPA.

(See generally,

Appellant's brief.)
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of that
statute. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute
must be construed as a whole. jQ,_ Where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, without
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988
P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581
(1996).
The language of J.C. § 19-4902(a) is plain: a petition must be brought
"within one (1) year ... from the determination of an appeal" of the underlying
criminal case.

The statute contains no provision exempting claims based on

some new authority or legal rule. Kriebel has cited to no authority holding that he
is · entitled by constitution or statute to collaterally attack his conviction or
sentence in Idaho courts beyond the bounds set by the Idaho Legislature. The
plain language of the statute does not include any "retroactivity" exception for
collateral attacks on a conviction under the UPCPA, and therefore Kriebel has
failed to show error in the dismissal of his untimely petition.
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E.

The Holding Of Estrada Does Not Meet The Applicable Test For
Retroactive Application
Even if there were a retroactivity exception to I.C. § 19-4902(a), Kriebel

has failed to show retroactivity would apply in this case.

A decision of the

Supreme Court of the United States must be given retroactive effect to cases
pending on direct review. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 141 n.1, 176 P.3d
911, 913 n.1 (2007) (quoting Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97
(1993)). But see State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 517, 181 P.3d 440, 443 (2008)
(case law overruling precedent upon which a defendant relied may not be given
retroactive effect to defendant's detriment) (citing State v. Moon, 140 Idaho 609,
611, 97 P.3d 476, 478 (Ct. App. 2004)).

Decisions of the Supreme Court

generally need not, however, be given retroactive effect on a collateral challenge
to a conviction. See, !Uh, Hoffman v. State, 142 Idaho 27, 29, 121 P.3d 958,
960 (2005) (decision requiring jury determination of defendant's eligibility for
death penalty not given retroactive application to cases not on direct review);
Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436, 438, 914 P.2d 933, 935 (1996) (stating, in dicta,
that new decision of Idaho Supreme Court would not apply retroactively in
collateral challenge to sentence).

Instead, the holding of a case will be given

retroactive application in collateral challenges to a judgment only if the holding of
the case represents a "new rule" that '"requires observance of procedures
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' In Re: Gafford, 127 Idaho 472, 476,
903 P.2d 61, 65 (1995) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), and
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Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 2

The holding in

Estrada, however, is neither a "new rule" nor one that is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."
1.

Estrada Did Not Create A "New Rule"

The holding in Estrada was not a "new rule." A "new rule" is one not
dictated by existing precedent and that was susceptible to reasonable debate at
the time judgment was rendered. Gafford, 127 Idaho at 476 n.1, 903 P.2d at 65
n.1 (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990)). The holdings of the
Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada were, by the Court's own reasoning, dictated by
precedent and not susceptible to debate; therefore, the holdings do not constitute
a "new rule."
Estrada was convicted of rape and ordered by the district court to undergo
a psychosexual evaluation. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 560, 149 P.3d 833,
835 (2006). Estrada initially did not want to participate in the evaluation, but did
after being advised to do so by his counsel.

Id.

Estrada claimed in post-

conviction proceedings that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him
that his privilege against compelled self-incrimination extended to participation in

2

The adoption of the Teague standard in In re: Gafford (albeit arguably in dicta)
seems to belie the assertion that Idaho courts should follow a different
retroactivity standard than the Supreme Court of the United States. Kriebel cites
no case more recent than 1982 for the proposition that Idaho may employ a
different standard. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-16.) More importantly, however,
Kriebel argued for application of the Teague standard below (R., pp. 40-41 );
therefore his claims that a different standard should have been applied by the
district court (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-16) are not preserved for review. State v.
Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991). See also State v.
Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000) (appellant is
estopped from asserting invited error on appeal).
8

the psychosexual evaluation.

j_g_,_

The district court agreed that counsel's failure

to so advise Estrada was deficient performance, but held that Estrada had failed
to establish prejudice.

j_g_,_

at 560-61, 149 P.3d at 835-36. The Idaho Court of

Appeals affirmed, but on the grounds that there was no clear law that a
defendant could invoke his privilege against self-incrimination to refuse
participation in a sentencing evaluation, and therefore his counsel's performance
was not deficient in failing to so advise Estrada. Id. at 561, 149 P.3d at 836.
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the lower courts.

In so doing, the

Court first held that the Sixth Amendment applied to Estrada's claim, but noted its
holding was "limited to the finding that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right
to counsel regarding only the decision of whether to submit to a psychos.exual
exam."

j_g_,_

at 562-63, 149 P.3d at 837-38 (emphasis added). The Court then

addressed whether counsel's performance had been deficient, and stated "[t]his
Court's decisions clearly indicate that both at the point of sentencing and earlier,
for purposes of a psychological evaluation, a defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination applies."
the court found prejudice.

j_g_,_

j_g_,_

at 563, 149 P.3d at 838. Finally,

at 565, 149 P.3d at 840.

That the Estrada Court itself felt it was applying an "old rule" instead of a
"new rule" is apparent from the Estrada decision. The Idaho Court of Appeals
had specifically held that it was declaring a "new rule" under the Fifth
Amendment, which was the basis of its holding that Estrada's counsel could not
be held to have performed deficiently.

The Idaho Supreme Court reversed,

however, concluding that the law was sufficiently well established to have

9

required Estrada's trial counsel to have advised him of his right against
compulsory self-incrimination in relation to the psychosexual evaluation.
Kriebel argues that Estrada enunciates a "new rule" under the Sixth
Amendment because it is in conflict with the holding of State v. Curless, 137
Idaho 138, 44 P.3d 1193 (Ct. App. 2002). (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) While
there is some merit to the argument that Curless should have controlled in
Estrada, ultimately the Estrada Court reasoned that counsel in that case should
have known of his duty to advise his client of his right to silence. "Under the
Teague framework, an old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a

new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct review."
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, _ , 127 S.Ct. 1173, 1180 (2007). Estrada
was seeking collateral review: if the Idaho Supreme Court had concluded it was
applying a "new rule," then Estrada himself would have been unable to take
advantage of the "new rule," and the Supreme Court would have affirmed the
lower courts. The Estrada court itself clearly rejected the concept that it was
applying a "new rule."
The Supreme Court of the United States has also rejected an argument
almost identical to that made by Kriebel in this case. In Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S.
211 (1988), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that precedent of the
Supreme Court of the United States (Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307(1985)) did
not apply retroactively. Aiken, 484 U.S. at 213. The South Carolina Attorney
General argued this was so because the Francis case was a "new rule" that was
not otherwise retroactively applicable. lg,_ at 215. The Supreme Court rejected

10

this argument, concluding that in the controlling case (Francis) the Court had
merely applied the rule announced in a prior case, and had stated in Francis that
it was so doing. Id. at 215-17.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada at least implicitly concluded it was
not applying a "new rule."

It certainly rejected the Idaho Court of Appeals'

reasoning that Estrada was not entitled to relief because the rule it was applying
was "new." If the rule in Estrada was in fact new (but failed to otherwise qualify
for retroactive application) it would not have applied to Estrada himself, or to any
other defendant whose direct review was completed prior to issuance of the
Estrada opinion. Kriebel has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the
Sixth Amendment rule in question was "new."
2.

Even If The Rule Announced In Estrada Were New. It Was Not
"Watershed"

Kriebel has failed to show that the rule announced in Estrada, even if it
were "new," meets the legal standards for retroactive application.

As stated

above, even a "new rule" is not retroactively applied unless it "'requires
observance of procedures 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'

In Re:

Gafford, 127 Idaho 472,476,903 P.2d 61, 65 (1995) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality
opinion)). A "new rule" does not meet this standard unless it is a "watershed rule
of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the
criminal proceeding." Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, _ , 127 S.Ct. 1173,
1181 (2007) (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted). "This exception

11

is extremely narrow."

kt (quotation

marks and citations omitted). The Supreme

Court has "observed that it is unlikely that any such rules have yet to emerge."

kt

(brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted). The Court has also, in

every case since Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), rejected every claim that
a new rule should be applied retroactively.

kt at 1181-82 (see cases cited).

The

"new rule" articulated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding
that "testimonial" statements may not be introduced without providing right to
confront declarant), did not qualify as "watershed." Bockting, 549 U.S. at _ ,
127 at 1182-84.
Kriebel has failed to show that the rule announced in Estrada, even if new,
was "watershed."
In order to qualify as watershed, a new rule must meet two
requirements. First, the rule must be necessary to prevent an
impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction. Second, the
rule must alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.
Bockting. 549 U.S. at_, 127 at 1182 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Application of this standard shows that Estrada's rule is not "watershed."
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed application of the
retroactivity standard to new sentencing rules in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S.
348 (2004), where the Court decided that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)
(holding that statutory aggravators that make a defendant eligible for the death
penalty must be decided by a jury), is not subject to retroactive application.
The Court first noted the applicable standard for the first part of the twopart test set forth above, then stated, "That a new procedural rule is

12

'fundamental' in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule must be one without
which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." Schriro,
542 U.S. at 352 (emphasis original, quotation marks and citations omitted).
Thus, in that case "the question is whether judicial factfinding so seriously
diminishes accuracy that there is an impermissibly large risk of punishing
conduct the law does not reach." l!;L_ at 355-56 (emphasis original, quotation
marks, brackets, and citations omitted). The Court stated it was "implausible that
judicial factfinding so seriously diminishes accuracy as to produce an
impermissibly large risk of injustice." l!;L. at 356 (emphasis original, quotation
marks, brackets, and citations omitted). Thus, the rule announced in the Ring
decision, requiring jury instead of judicial factfinding, was not "watershed." Id.
Here Kriebel has not established that sentencing under the rubric of law
prior to Estrada "seriously diminishes" the accuracy of factfinding in sentencing
such there was an "impermissibly large risk of injustice." There is no indication
that a significant number of defendants will choose to exercise their Fifth
Amendment rights and forgo an evaluation. Those who choose to participate in
the evaluation are in the same position as all defendants pre-Estrada, and are
not at greater risk of injustice than those who refuse the evaluation. In addition,
depriving the sentencing court of an evaluation seems more calculated to making
factfinding regarding rehabilitation potential less accurate, rather than more
accurate; indeed, it seems apparent that most defendants who exercise their
rights and refuse an evaluation out of fear of incrimination will do so with the
hope that factfinding at sentencing will be less accurate. In short, while trials,
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sentencings and other court proceedings cannot be counted on to be accurate if
a defendant is entirely deprived of all rights to counsel, the rule that counsel have
an obligation to accurately describe to their clients their right to refuse a
sentencing evaluation is not a rule that seriously enhances the accuracy of
sentencing.
Likewise, having counsel's advice on the right to remain silent for a
psychosexual evaluation does not "alter our understanding of the bedrock
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding." Indeed, having
that advice merely allows a defendant to make a tactical decision whether to
participate in an evaluation because he believes participation will ultimately help
at sentencing, or decline to participate because he believes participation will be
incriminating in the sense that it would lead to a longer sentence. An evaluation
itself is not constitutionally required; whether a defendant invokes his right to
silence and participates in the evaluation or instead elects to not participate is
simply not a bedrock procedural element essential to a fair sentencing.
Kriebel does not even try to apply this standard in his case.

On the

contrary, he argues that any new rule expanding the right to effective assistance
of counsel in any way is watershed. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13.)
The flaw in this argument is that in the cases Kriebel cites the issue was
denial of counsel, not merely whether the defendant had the effective assistance

of counsel.

See Aresenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968) (right to

presence of counsel at plea hearings); McConnell v. Rhay. 393 U.S. 2 (1968)
(right to presence of counsel at probation revocation proceedings). In Estrada

14

there was no claim that Estrada was denied counsel; his only claim was that his
counsel had acted ineffectively when he encouraged Estrada to participate in the
evaluation without informing him that he had a right to not participate. Estrada,
143 Idaho at 562-63, 149 P.3d at 837-38 (Estrada's right articulated as right to
advice, not presence). There is a fundamental difference between the absolute
denial of counsel and a holding that counsel was constitutionally required to give
accurate advice on legal rights that might have been asserted in relation to an
ordered psychological evaluation.
In Estrada the Idaho Supreme Court applied the holding of Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), in the context of a non-capital case, stating that it
would "make no sense" to afford a criminal defendant the right to counsel at the
guilty plea hearing and sentencing but then hold that he was not "entitled to the
advice of counsel in the interim period regarding a psychosexual evaluation."
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562.

Kriebel has failed to show how this ruling is

"watershed," as that term is defined in the law.

11.
Kriebel Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Claim He Was Denied
Access To The Courts
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that Kriebel had failed to establish grounds for

equitable tolling such that the petition would be deemed timely. (R., pp. 48-51.)
Kriebel argues due process demanded equitable tolling of the time to file his
petition. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-21.) Kriebel's argument fails on both the facts
and the law.
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B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted.
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law.

kl.:. at 434, 835 P.2d

at 669.

C.

Kriebel Was Not Entitled To "Equitable Tolling" Of The Time To File His
Post-Conviction Petition
Generally, "equitable tolling" is available only where the petitioner shows

that "extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his petition on time."
Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2nd Cir. 2000) (discussing equitable
tolling theories in the context of federal habeas petitions); see Chico-Rodriguez v.
State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005) (discussing
"extraordinary circumstances" and acknowledging "the bar for equitable tolling for
post-conviction actions is high"). Idaho appellate courts have recognized that the
one-year limitation period of I.C. § 19-4902 may be tolled if an applicant is
prevented, either by mental disease or by being denied access to courts, from
earlier pursuing challenges to his or her conviction. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho
957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2003); Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788,
791, 992 P.2d 783, 786 (Ct. App. 1999).
A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must also demonstrate a causal
connection between the "extraordinary circumstance" and failure to timely file a
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petition. The Idaho Court of Appeals explained, in the context of a claim of tolling
due to mental illness:
We hold that in order for the statute of limitation under the UPCPA
to be tolled on account of a mental illness, an unrepresented
petitioner must show that he suffered from a serious mental illness
which rendered him incompetent to understand his legal right to
bring an action within a year or otherwise rendered him incapable
of taking necessary steps to pursue that right. Equitable tolling will
apply only during the period in which the petitioner's mental illness
actually prevented him from filing a post-conviction action; any
period following conviction during which the petitioner fails to meet
the equitable tolling criteria will count toward the limitation period.
Chico-Rodriquez v. State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App.
2005) (emphasis added).
Kriebel argues on appeal that he should have been afforded equitable
tolling because he "was housed in an out-of-state facility with no access to Idaho
legal resources" and because his criminal trial attorney "informed [him] that he
had no good prospects for filing a post-conviction petition," which advice proved
wrong once the Estrada opinion was issued some months later.

(Appellant's

brief, p. 21.) These claims are neither factually accurate nor legally sufficient to
show error by the district court.
The allegations actually made by Kriebel were that he was in prison in
Washington for up to four months in late 2005 (shortly after sentencing in the
criminal case).

(R., p. 36.)

There was no attempt to show that being

incarcerated in Washington, on Washington charges, denied Kriebel access to
the courts in Idaho. Although he claims on appeal that he lacked access to Idaho
legal resources while in Washington, he did not allege that or present evidence of
it below.

The mere allegation that he was incarcerated in Washington on a
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Washington charge is not enough to show lack of access to the Idaho courts.
Kriebel failed to even allege, much less establish by evidence, that his
incarceration in Washington was the reason he did not file his post-conviction
petition during September through December 2005, much less, as the district
court concluded, explain why he did not file before October 16, 2006.
Likewise, Kriebel alleged that he contacted his criminal trial attorney, in
early 2006, and filed the letter sent him by counsel. (Augmentation.) That letter
does not mention post-conviction, whether there would be a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the right to silence in relation to psychosexual sentencing
evaluations, or any other matter relevant to the current claim. More importantly,
there is no claim or showing of how counsel's advice "actually prevented," ChicoRodriquez, 141 Idaho at 582, 114 P.3d at 140, Kriebel from filing his postconviction petition before October 16, 2006. In short, nothing in the letter rises to
the level of proving that his trial counsel denied Kriebel access to the Idaho
Courts.
To be entitled to equitable tolling, Kriebel must establish that he was
denied access to Idaho's courts. None of the claims he supported with evidence
rise to the level of showing such denial of access, much less that the denial of
access prevented him from filing in a timely fashion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
of summary dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 2nd day of March 2009.
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